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Summary A qualitative study was carried out in order to investigate illness rep-
resentations of people with non-epileptic seizures (NES) in relation to Leventhal’s
self-regulation or common sense model. Nine participants with NES took part in
semi-structured interviews and transcripts were analysed using an approach from
interpretative phenomenological analysis. Data were coded according to the ﬁve ele-
ments of the self-regulation model (identity, cause, time-line, consequences, control-
lability) and two additional themes. Particularly evident was participants’ confusion
about their experience, what to call their condition, and its cause. It was therefore
difﬁcult for participants to express clear ideas about the time-line of their illness and
its control or cure. Also evident was a tendency to categorise illness in dualistic terms
as either organic or psychological. There was some dissatisfaction with doctors where
ideas about the nature of the illness did not match. It is concluded that a clear idea
of illness identity and cause may be necessary for successful management.
© 2003 BEA Trading Ltd. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Non-epileptic seizures (NES) is a condition where
clinical seizures occur without electroencephalo-
graphic evidence of epilepsy1 but the seizures are
still seizures2 and likely to be as disruptive to an
individual’s life as epileptic seizures. However,
despite a substantial literature on NES, very lit-
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-117-918-6710.
E-mail address: andrew.green@north-bristol.swest.nhs.uk
(A. Green).
tle is known about the individual’s experience of
the condition. This contrasts with other conditions
where there is also no established medical expla-
nation, such as chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS)3,4
or irritable bowel syndrome5,6 and also contrasts
with epilepsy.7—9 The importance of understand-
ing sufferers’ perceptions of an illness is no longer
doubted because they affect adjustment to the
illness, acceptance of treatment and treatment
outcomes.10,11 For most people it is important for
them to know how to categorise or name their
illness,12 its causes7 and whether, or how much,
they are responsible for the illness.13
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A common ﬁnding in studies of illness beliefs
is that people’s ideas are often at odds with
medical wisdom.14—16 It has also been observed
that, whether scientiﬁcally right or wrong, peo-
ple conceptualise and discuss illness in scientiﬁc
and dualistic terms.12,17,18 This concurs with the
long-standing observation that biomedicine is part
of western culture19 and that it is a dominant folk
model of illness.20 However, the medical model
does not easily accommodate somatisation disor-
ders, the existence of which, according to Kirmayer
and Young,21 is a reﬂection of the ‘persistent
mind—body dualism of western medicine’ (p. 422);
somatisation is a residual category between the
somatic and the psychic which can accommodate
the recalcitrant patient, who ﬁts neither category,
into the medical system. The evidence from a num-
ber of studies relating to medically unexplained
symptoms (MUS) in general12 and to irritable bowel
syndrome5 and CFS3 suggests that many people
seek to understand and explain their symptoms in
biomedical terms, speciﬁcally, as part of an organic
illness.
Numerous attempts have been made to construct
models of lay beliefs about health and illness, but
most relate to precautionary or preventative be-
haviour, for example, the health belief model.22
One model that differs in addressing beliefs about
illness experience is one self-regulation model, or
common-sense model of Leventhal et al.23, which
proposes that behaviour in relation to dealing with
illness, as well as preventing it, can be seen in
the context of the patient’s own representation
of the illness. The model assumes that people
are active problem solvers and are motivated to
avoid and treat illness in accordance with the
perceived threat posed by the illness. The illness
representation consists of ﬁve elements: iden-
tity (symptoms and label), cause, consequences
(effects on life or life-style), time-line (time to
develop and duration) and controllability or cure.
In a three stage processing system, people are
said to generate an emotional reaction to the ill-
ness as well as the illness representation; coping
strategies are generated in the second stage and
appraised in the third. The model has been used
extensively in studies relating to a wide range of
conditions. The research has been reviewed re-
cently by Hagger and Orbell24 who conclude that
there is a moderate to strong relationship between
illness cognitions, coping behaviour and illness
outcomes.
The self-regulation model has been used in stud-
ies relating to MUS, speciﬁcally irritable bowel
syndrome6 and CFS25,26 and would appear to be a
useful framework for investigating beliefs about
NES. Evaluating the model in this context was one
purpose of this exploratory study, thereby allowing
the possibility that measures based on the model27
might be used in further research. The principle
aim, however, was to establish whether individuals’
beliefs about NES could be elicited and understood
so that subsequent studies might investigate pos-
sible relationships between beliefs and coping and
outcome. Comparative data relating to people with
CFS, with a fuller analysis of the model, will be
reported elsewhere.
Method
Qualitative methods were selected as most appro-
priate for the initial exploration of such complex
issues and to gain deeper understanding of personal
beliefs. To achieve this, semi-structured interviews
were conducted. The study was approved by the lo-
cal research ethics committee and an opportunistic
sample was recruited from neuropsychiatry out-
patient clinics during a 6-month study period. All
patients over the age of 18 at the time of diagnosis
of NES, made by a consultant neuropsychiatrist, on
the basis of ambulatory EEG and clinical evidence,
were invited to participate. Some participants
had a previous diagnosis of epilepsy (see Table 1)
but none was known to have a concurrent diagno-
sis of epilepsy. Interviews were conducted by the
ﬁrst author in a hospital ofﬁce or in participants’
homes, according to their preference. They were
initially asked to relate an account of their illness
with minimum prompting from the interviewer;
they were then asked questions relating more
speciﬁcally to the elements of the self-regulation
model (see Appendix A); questions were based on
those used by Earll et al.15 in a study relating to
motor neurone disease. Interviews, which lasted
between 30 and 60min (average 40min), were
audiotape-recorded and subsequently transcribed
verbatim.
An interpretative phenomenological analysis
approach28 was used to analyse transcripts. During
repeated readings text was coded initially accord-
ing to the elements of the self-regulation model
(identity, cause, time-line, consequences, con-
trollability); this accounted for a majority of the
text. Remaining text was coded according to other
themes derived from the data. Clusters of themes
were noted and sought in later readings for con-
ﬁrmation or rejection. Issues of quality are impor-
tant in both qualitative research and quantitative
research29,30 and to ensure credibility of the data
in the present qualitative study, transcripts were
examined by the co-authors.
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Table 1 Participants.
Number and
pseudonym
Sex Age Age at which
episodes started
Former employment Notes
1. Shirley F 42 39 Clerical/admin Previous episodes of ‘fainting’ 10
years earlier following neurosurgery
2. Pauline F 51 50 Health professional
3. George M 65 57 Management Diagnosis of epilepsy as a young man:
nocturnal seizures only. Seizure free
for 30+ years
4. Bill M 53 51 Skilled self-employed Two previous series of episodes 25
and 20 years earlier. No diagnosis of
epilepsy
5. Barry M 34 33 Trade Former diagnosis of epilepsy.
Seizure-free 5 years. Off medication
for 1 year before episodes started
6. Carol F 39 11 Unskilled Diagnosis of epilepsy at age 11 12 .
Diagnosis changed to NES in previous
12 months
7. Russell M 38 34 Semi-professional Also has panic attacks: wife has
epilepsy
8. Julie F 30 24 Care worker
9. Sally F 40 20 Skilled self-employed Epilepsy in childhood: controlled.
Seizures again at 19 with diagnosis of
epilepsy at age 20. Investigated for
surgery. Unclear exactly when
diagnosis changed to NES
Findings
Nine participants with NES were recruited. Table 1
shows the biographical details of the participants
with the pseudonyms used here. Their illness rep-
resentations will be described in relation to the el-
ements of the self-regulation model and the other
major themes that emerged. Quotes have been
selected to summarise an individual’s stated views
and to represent the range of ideas expressed, that
is, the majority view as well as the more extreme
views.
Identity
In describing their illness the participants gave
complex and sometimes unclear accounts of their
experiences. To illustrate this, and the variety of
the events experienced by participants, an ex-
tract from each account is presented.#1 Variability
was the outstanding feature. Only Shirley stated
that her episodes were consistent: ‘It’s never ever
changed: a headache, em, and then within an
hour [ ] I’m gone [ ] and then it’s about half an
hour before I fully recover’. Two participants de-
#1 Omitted text is denoted by square brackets [ ] and a pause
in speech thus: . . . .
scribed only one type of experience: ‘I completely
go blank; I don’t know when they’re going to hap-
pen, I fall to the ﬂoor and [I’m]–—quite aggressive’
(Carol); ‘It gradually goes when, er, I start slur-
ring my words a bit and I start getting extremely
aggressive. I can swear that black’s white and
white’s black [ ] I ﬁnd sometimes sitting down
watching television the whole thing sort of starts
going like that in front of my face {makes waving
motion with hands} . . . I can’t concentrate on it
[ ] which is why I tend to sort of go and wrap myself
up and go away somewhere [ ] and sleep it off’.
(George)
Pauline and Sally stated that episodes varied: ‘It’s
not always the same, [ ]–—it sometimes can be a
complete blank–—there is nothing there. It–—I just
can’t explain it [ ] and that is when I ﬁnd I, I go and
I’m in, I’m in the tunnel. There’s a light at the end
of it. I don’t always go towards the light, I just stay
in the tunnel; I don’t really want to go anywhere
[ ]–—I suppose that’s probably when I actually go
into the f-seizure [ ] because after that I don’t re-
member nothing’ (Pauline); ‘They still vary; em,
sometimes I could just be sitting and start mum-
bling and go into something–—some weird conver-
sation or something and fumble around with a few
things, em, [ ] and being like that to, em, goi- go-
ing into, you know, the body with the convulsions
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and, and, you know, quite a lot of physical activity’.
(Sally)
Other participants implied that episodes varied:
‘I get a feeling and I’ll just go out anywhere and [ ]
I fall to the ground [ ]; it lasts from a minute to ﬁve
minutes; [ ] they reckon I go stiff as a board . . . on
some of them. [ ] Some of them–—well, if I have it in
bed, well, I–—as I do get them at night–—I shake, but
not like, [ ] throwing your arms or kicking anybody, I
just actually just shake . . . very slightly’ (Bill); ‘I go
very vacant–—the, the noise (‘‘Like dentists’ drills
in my head’’) takes over, er, but then my head’ll
start twitching, em–—and it will do that for quite
some time, and sometimes [ ] it happens and stops,
but it will start twitching and then [ ] my head
tends to focus in one spot, over my shoulder, [ ]
my leg starts tapping the ﬂoor in a rhythmic way
{demonstrates}–—hard, em, I try to hit myself [ ]
and once, once I start that [ ] within seconds I’m,
I’m ﬁtting’ (Russell); ‘I’ve been told that I could
be in mid-conversation, then my eyes will shoot up
to . . . the, the top of my eyelids, em, and I will
fall; I will go stiff, arch my back, em, sometimes I
start foaming at the mouth; it could either be clear
or it could be white frothy, depending, and then I
will start shaking . . . em, and it could last anything
from a few seconds up to a minute, and . . . I know
nothing of that happening’. (Julie)
Barry’s experience was different; he reported a
single episode lasting 2 hours but otherwise com-
plained mostly of fatigue, not mentioning seizures
until asked: ‘I’ve had a couple, but only little ones
. . . not real grand mals [ ] no, em, fall on the ﬂoor
convulsions. I’ve had like, . . . where I’ve still been
aware, [ ]–—I’ve had the aura, then I’ve had a bit
of limb jerking . . . and then it’s gone’.
Four participants previously had a diagnosis of
epilepsy (see Table 1) and might naturally have as-
sumed that this was what they had now. Barry, who
appeared confused, said: ‘I don’t knowwhether it’s
the epilepsy’s taken another turn. [ ] They don’t
think it’s epilepsy [ ] but they’re not sure either be-
cause of me, er, EEG coming back normal’. The oth-
ers appeared to accept that it was not epilepsy but
Carol remained angry over the recent change of di-
agnosis and expressed a feeling of being a fraud (see
below); George felt it was ‘different’ from epilepsy
and subsequently accepted a diagnosis of depres-
sion. Sally had had seizures from an early age and
had been assessed for surgery: ‘I did at one time
believe it [to be epilepsy]–—or thought I believed it
. . . but the real me [ ] I can’t say that I believe’.
The others typically did not know at ﬁrst what
their condition was and some remained uncertain
after seeing their doctors. Most had considered
epilepsy and only Bill appeared not to have thought
of it. Shirley, however, ruled it out: ‘They thought
it was epilepsy [ ] but I’ve always known it wasn’t’.
Conversely, Pauline still suspected epilepsy: ‘In a
way, yes, I am pleased it’s not [epilepsy] but in an-
other way [ ] I think I’ve got epilepsy. I don’t think
it’s non-epileptic at all, but then again, I’m not
a professional’. The participants’ uncertainty was
reﬂected in the variety of terms used to describe
their illness or their ‘episodes’, ranging from terms
associated with epilepsy (seizure, ﬁt, convulsion)
to the more neutral (funny turn, blackout, going
down) and the more measured ‘I have episodes like
an epileptic’ (Carol) or ‘seizure or ﬁts similar to
epilepsy, but it’s not that’. (Julie)
Cause
All participants had thought about the cause of their
condition. While none put forward any detailed
theory, there was a readiness by most to accept
psychological factors. Only Barry and Bill denied
any stress, citing possible ‘pressure on the brain’
or an apparently minor childhood head injury, but
all others referred to stress. Even Pauline, with her
suspicion of epilepsy, cited no organic cause and
acknowledged: ‘[I] have been under quite a lot of
stress and been through quite a lot of trauma’.
Julie, however, was unequivocal in stating: ‘it’s a
psychological illness’ and George, while acknowl-
edging heart and circulation problems said: ‘it’s
purely mental, [ ] self-induced’. Four others men-
tioned contemporary problems and/or childhood
difﬁculties (including bereavement, separation
and physical abuse). For example, Shirley (who
rejected the suggestion of epilepsy) cited several
sources of stress in her life but then still suggested
a physical cause: ‘I’ve always said it’s my way of
my brain shutting me down and saying I’ve had
enough. [ ] I suppose it could be my background
. . . what I’ve been through. [ ] I don’t honestly
think physically there’s anything wrong. I’ve al-
ways thought: after the operation, or through the
operation, something on my brain was knocked’.
There were therefore some contradictory ideas but
there was no combination of ideas about cause, for
example, that stress somehow caused or permitted
an organic process to take place.
Consequences
NES appeared to be as potentially restrictive as
epilepsy. Julie’s description of the effect of seizures
on her life is both comprehensive and typical:
‘Before I started having these ﬁts [ ] I had a job, I
had a car, I could drive, I had my–—what I thought
was independence. [ ] I could do everything in what
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I wanted to do, em, and I honestly thought my
world had ended. [ ] {sigh} I’ve had to completely
change my life around–—I mean, even crossing a
road [ ] I always make sure I’ll walk on a crossing;
[ ] I can’t have a bath unless someone is around
just in case I go into something; [ ] I’ve got to make
sure if I go shopping [ ] someone is with me’.
However, despite the restriction and isolation,
only one participant (Sally) regarded it as ‘very
serious’; the others considered it ‘not serious’;
George said it was ‘inconvenient’. There was a
tendency to talk about getting on with life in spite
of illness; as George put it: ‘Life goes as it goes,
frankly, and you take each turning as you come
to it’. Participants mentioned no positive conse-
quence of illness, such as spending more time with
the family or having chance to re-evaluate their
life, although Julie and Sally said they had bene-
ﬁted personally from psychotherapy which had not,
however, stopped their seizures.
Time-line
There was no suggestion that NES has any kind of
course or that there is a ‘disease process’. When
asked about progress, participants often remarked
that they did not look to the future and, like Shirley,
took ‘one day at a time’. While Barry indicated his
condition might be progressive, only one partici-
pant, Bill, stated that his would get worse: ‘it’s
not like you’re young when you’re going to grow
out of it; I seem to be growing into it’. Another
participant, Carol, thought hers would not change
in 6 months, or ever. Sally, on the other hand, pre-
dicted some progress: ‘I just think that they’re
just going to keep on improving’. Improvement
for most others, however, seemed to be related
more to their own efforts to control their problems
(see below).
Controllability/cure
The participants mentioned few speciﬁc means
of controlling their seizures or episodes. Carol
said: ‘Nothing can help’ and Bill and Barry saw no
prospect of any cure unless it transpired that all
along they had had a tumour which was amenable
to surgery. Bill and Shirley could at least prepare
themselves if they felt an attack was imminent. ‘I
can control what happens to me insomuch as I can
make myself safe, and make my child safe. But the
rest of it, I’ve got no control over’ (Shirley). About
half of the participants implied that they could
take some control but could not say quite how. For
example, Sally said: ‘it’s up to me’ and Julie: ‘I
know I’ve got a lot of control there over them but
not consciously. [ ] If I can make myself have these
attacks then I can make myself stop them’.
George had the clearest ideas, almost suggest-
ing a cognitive behavioural approach, and making
the only mention of medication as being helpful:
‘What can be done? . . . Well, obviously the medica-
tion (anti-depressant). . . . That’s one of the things.
[ ] I can do a lot myself to overcome situations. I
can really, sort of . . . be happier [ ] I do tend to
be miserable and look on the black side of things.
[ ] I think it’s entirely up to me’. Russell was an
exception in citing hope through his religious faith
and, while taking some responsibility himself, also
looked to others for help: ‘In a way, I suppose, I
keep on ho- hoping that I’m going mad because if
I’m going mad it’s all in the mind and if somebody
can sort me out, that’s the cure [ ] or keep it as
epilepsy, ‘cause then there’s, er, medication to,
to control it’. No participant mentioned trying any
type of alternative or complementary therapy.
Other themes
There were two signiﬁcant themes that did not ﬁt
easily within the framework of the self-regulation
model: one related to the participants’ own accep-
tance of, or feelings about, their situation and the
other to the acceptance and understanding of oth-
ers. Participants’ own feelings ranged from a sense
of hopelessness through resignation to optimistic
coping. This did not appear to relate to the dura-
tion of the illness. Carol seemed particularly hope-
less about her future: when asked what might help,
she said: ‘open the ground and let me go inside’.
The majority, however, appeared more resigned.
For Julie seizures were a ‘way of life’ and Bill was
‘used to it’. George spoke for several when he said
‘life goes as it goes’. But for two participants there
was an element of deﬁance as expressed by Shirley:
if all I can do is [ ] learn to cope with it, well, I
will’. Only Sally, who described her illness as ‘very
serious’, made no comment about coping.
Acceptance by others related mostly to doc-
tors. There was no mention of stigma and only
one participant said that friends had rejected her
although many had withdrawn themselves from
social contact. Bill and Carol both said they saw
no point in seeing doctors any longer (but did).
Other comments related to a sense of fraudulence
or to an inferred accusation of attention seeking;
for example, Russell said: ‘It makes you feel a
fraud . . . especially when your wife’s epileptic–—it
makes you feel as if you’re just out for attention.
[ ] I hate it’. Others highlighted communication
difﬁculties with doctors: ‘When I get taken to hos-
pital [ ] they’re very rude. [ ] I feel that they’re
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thinking that I put it all on’ (Carol); ‘It was the way
he (neurologist)–—it was told to me–—and I felt as
if they think I was actually inducing them myself–—
like attention seeking’ (Pauline). Julie complained
that her consultant physician told her to ‘buck up
her ideas’ and get back to work: ‘He made me an-
gry. Em, . . . I felt that he didn’t . . . understand
where I was coming from. Em, I might have been
physically okay but there was still something, you
know, psychologically wrong with me’.
The aim in this study was to explore the range
of participants’ experiences but certain common
themes have emerged. Participants tended to give
an unclear account of seizures and they were un-
certain what to call the condition and unsure about
its cause while acknowledging a possible link with
stress. Although consequences might appear seri-
ous to others, participants typically did not describe
the condition as such and would either be resigned
to having it or would be trying to cope. The illness
was perceived as having no course and no control
except through unspeciﬁed personal effort. Partici-
pants may have had perceived negative experiences
with doctors or other health professionals.
Discussion
The purpose of the study was to investigate illness
representations of people with NES and to evaluate
the self-regulation model as a means of understand-
ing them. However, before discussing the ﬁndings
it is necessary to consider some methodological
issues. It should be noted that as the object was
to gain insight, it was not necessary or intended
to recruit a ‘representative’ sample31 although it
has been observed29 that it is important to include
those who appear typical as well as those who ap-
pear divergent. The resulting group in this study
included more men than are found in other studies
(e.g. 85% women in one study32) and had a higher
average age. Age, however, is problematic since
the age at which the NESs started is more relevant,
but even that may be complicated by earlier, possi-
bly incorrect, diagnosis of epilepsy. One constraint
that must be acknowledged is the setting: it is
possible that participants recruited through liaison
psychiatry or neurology clinics, for example, would
have had different experiences or beliefs. Having
a former or concurrent diagnosis of epilepsy might
also affect responses but no participant was known
to have a dual diagnosis and changing diagnosis is
characteristic of the population.33
One objective of the study was to evaluate the
self-regulation model and the data were therefore
analysed using the model as a framework but it
could be argued that this imposed constraints on
the analysis. However, further consideration of the
data suggests that while themes could have been
classiﬁed differently, the issues still emerged and
have been described as they relate to the different
elements of the model: for example, uncertainty,
confusion, wanting to know, loss, lack of control.
The outstanding issue, which related to most ele-
ments of the model, was uncertainty.
Uncertainty was most striking in the participants’
complex accounts and sometimes confusing de-
scriptions of their seizures. This reﬂects the ﬁnd-
ings of Elderkin-Thompson et al.34 who found that
the narrative of patients with somatisation disor-
ders in medical consultations was more likely to
include ambiguities and to be organised themati-
cally rather than chronologically. However, perhaps
it should not be surprising that people give unclear
accounts of what may be confusing experiences
and this need not be conﬁned to somatisation or
MUSs: Faircloth9 quotes unclear descriptions of the
experience of epileptic seizures. Another possi-
bility is that people with NES may have difﬁculty
expressing their needs and feelings because of poor
verbal skills35 but the participants in the current
study were mostly articulate.
Although participants were uncertain about their
diagnosis, a likely initial conclusion might be that
they had epilepsy. While self-diagnosis is possible
in a relatively widely known condition like CFS,4
self-diagnosis of NES is unlikely. Participants had
not heard of the condition and the very concept
of seizures that are non-epileptic would seem
counter-intuitive for most people. Consequently,
without a clear label or diagnosis it appears to
be difﬁcult for participants to have clear ideas
relating to other elements of the self-regulation
model. They were able to suggest general theories
on cause, which could be categorised as organic
or psychological, but no participant suggested an
actual mechanism or process by which seizures oc-
curred. Furthermore, without clear ideas on cause,
it is not surprising that many participants were un-
able to offer speciﬁc ideas on time-line or control:
they had no reason to believe there was any course
of their illness. However, there was an indication
of a relationship between elements of the model;
it is notable, for example, that those with a ﬁrmer
belief in a psychological explanation (despite a
former diagnosis of epilepsy) believed they could
take some control of their seizures. Similarly, it
has been found that external attribution of cause
of CFS (e.g. a virus) is associated with greater
disability and poorer outcome.36
It is probable that people wholly rejecting
stress as a cause would have been unavailable to
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participate in this study since continued atten-
dance at a neuropsychiatry outpatient clinic would
be unlikely. However, a minority of participants
discounted stress and still suspected epilepsy or
some other organic cause of their seizures. It may
be supposed that it would be a relief not to have
a diagnosis of epilepsy but it is likely that there is
less perceived personal blame with epilepsy. There
is also likely to be less perceived personal respon-
sibility for management, and more hope, with the
prospect of anti-convulsant medication, as one
participant explained, or even surgery. In contrast,
Scambler7 observed that stress was welcomed as
a cause of epilepsy; stress might preclude a more
threatening cause or it may suggest that the diag-
nosis is wrong and offer hope of a cure.
It is not clear why participants mostly considered
their condition not to be as serious as might be ex-
pected. It has been found that people with NES per-
ceive their seizures to be as severe as do those with
themost severe epilepsy37 and that NESmay impose
greater limitations than complex partial seizures.38
However, there is evidence that many people with
epilepsy may not consider that to be serious either,
at least insofar that they were coping well.8,39
Studies in the USA suggest that people with NES and
people with epilepsy have comparable levels of
employment and income35 and quality of life.35,38
Statements about coping with NES were similar to
Schneider and Conrad’s39 pragmatic type of ad-
justed coping in epilepsy: ‘I’ve got it and I’ll deal
with it’.
Although comments about coping were cate-
gorised separately from the self-regulation model
they could, however, relate to emotional reaction
to illness and its consequences. Remarks about
understanding and acceptance by doctors do not
appear to be linked to the self-regulation model
and may be speciﬁc to MUS or somatisation disor-
ders because of their position in relation to western
medicine.21 The ﬁndings that participants spoke
of their illness in dualistic terms and reported
perceived hostility from some doctors supports
Kendell’s40 assertion that the distinction between
physical and mental illness is still made by both lay
and professional people. The general view of par-
ticipants in this study was that organic illness was
genuine whereas if it was considered psychological,
it was less genuine; in that case participants were
likely to feel rejected by doctors as malingerers,
time-wasters or attention-seekers. The negative
experiences of the participant who attended an
accident and emergency department reﬂect the
ﬁndings of a classic study of staff attitudes towards
patients who did not have a ‘real’ illness.41 The
perceived rejection by doctors (GPs, neurologists,
physicians) highlights a paradox for people with
NES. A belief in an organic cause might help a per-
son to make sense of their experience but they can
be offered little help by general medicine once
NES is suspected. On the other hand, attribution
to psychological factors did not adequately explain
the condition for the participants in this study; it
may offer the possibility of some control but it re-
mained far from clear to them how anything can
help. As noted, those suspecting an organic cause
were more likely to expect their condition to de-
teriorate while those with the clearest beliefs in
a psychological cause were most positive about
resolution.
With regard to evaluation of the self-regulation
model, the ﬁndings suggest that a deﬁnite la-
bel (identity) whether right or wrong in medical
terms, is necessary for a person to have deﬁnite
ideas on the other elements of the self-regulation
model. Williams and Healy42 question the utility
of the model if identity is never achieved; how-
ever, evidence from studies on CFS suggests that
it is not necessary to have a representation of ill-
ness identity which is consistent with medicine in
order to form ideas about other aspects of this
condition.25,26 The difﬁculty for people with NES
is that illness identity or diagnosis may be prob-
lematic and the ﬁndings of this study suggest that
there may be a linear relationship between the
elements of the model whereby identity must pre-
cede cause, and beliefs concerning time-line and
control (themselves interrelated) depend on iden-
tity and cause. This observation will be discussed
more fully in a further paper.
The self-regulation model proved to be a use-
ful framework for investigating illness representa-
tions of people with NES although the model did
not allow for a full explanation of these represen-
tations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect
people to have ideas about the elements of the
model and that they do not is also a signiﬁcant ﬁnd-
ing. If an illness experience does not ﬁt within the
self-regulation model, or common-sense model, it
could be proposed that it does not accord with com-
mon sense in the way that, for example, a per-
son with osteoarthritis might understand or explain
their illness in terms of ‘wear and tear’. As sug-
gested, patients with NES do not always receive
an understandable explanation from biomedicine.
While protocols for the presentation of the diagno-
sis of NES have been devised43 there is often still
no real suggestion of cause that a person can un-
derstand. The challenge for clinicians, therefore, is
to ﬁnd a way of helping people understand NES in
more ‘scientiﬁc’ terms so that they may begin to
formulate their own ideas about control.
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Conclusion
This study has shown that people with a diagnosis
of NES express unclear ideas about their condition
and that without a deﬁnite label for their illness,
their ideas on other aspects of the illness are also
unclear. It has also been found that people with
NES are likely to conceptualise their illness in du-
alistic terms as either organic or psychological.
The participants wanted a scientiﬁc or biomedical
explanation; some favoured organic causes and
felt rejected when psychological causes were sug-
gested. These ﬁndings raise the question whether
a clear illness identity and a clear understanding
of, or theory about, cause are prerequisites for
successful management or resolution. Further in-
vestigation is needed to explore the relationship
between illness representations and outcome in
NES and other MUSs.
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Appendix A. Interview schedule
I’d like to ask about your illness. Please tell me the
story, from the beginning, of what has happened to
you–—how you noticed something was wrong, what
you did then, what happened when you ﬁrst saw a
doctor, and so on up to the present.
Follow up as needed: What did you think the ill-
ness was at ﬁrst? What did you think about what x
said about you illness? Did you agree?
Identity: How have you been in the last month?
What symptoms have you experienced?
Many people have their own ideas about what
might be wrong with them; in your opinion, what
do you think is wrong with you?
How do you describe your condition to acquain-
tances? What do you call it?
Cause: A lot of people have their own ideas about
what caused their illness. What ideas do you have
about the cause of yours?
Follow up questions to ascertain the origin of
ideas: e.g. Is that what your doctor told you?
Are there other people in your family with a sim-
ilar illness? Do you know anyone else who has a sim-
ilar illness?
Consequences: How would you describe the con-
sequences of your illness–—how has it affected your
life and what you do?
Compared with other illnesses, how serious do
you think your illness is? (if necessary: compared,
for example, with diabetes, depression, heart dis-
ease, arthritis, epilepsy, migraine, high blood pres-
sure).
Time-line: How do you think you will be in 6
months? Do you foresee any change by this time
next year?
Control/cure: Some people ﬁnd ways to manage
their illness; how much control do you think you
have over your symptoms?
What do you think can be done to make you bet-
ter?
Who/what can help you get better?
What do you think about doctors after your expe-
rience of this illness?
Is there anything else you think it might be helpful
for me to know?
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